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WHAT TO DO ON SPRING BREAK? 
The Role of Predicted, On-Line, and Remembered Experience in Future Choice 
Derrick Wirtz, Justin Kruger, Christie Napa Scollon, and Ed Diener 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
Abstract—When individuals choose future activities on the basis of their past experiences, 
what guides those choices? The present study compared students’ predicted, on-line, and 
remembered spring-break experiences, as well as the influence of these factors on students’ 
desire to take a similar vacation in the future. Predicted and remembered experiences were 
both more positive—and, paradoxically, more negative— than on-line experiences. Of key 
importance, path analyses revealed that remembered experience, but neither on-line nor 
anticipated experience, directly predicted the desire to repeat the experience. These results 
suggest that although on-line measures may be superior to retrospective measures for 
approximating objective experience, retrospective measures may be superior for predicting 
choice. 
 
How does experience influence choice? The psychological principle of reinforcement posits 
an automatic association between experience and behavior. That is, people repeat experiences 
that they enjoy and avoid those that they do not. But do people know how much they have 
enjoyed past experiences? Research has shown people’s memory of events is often 
inconsistent with their self-reported moment-by-moment experience during those events. In 
one study, cyclists were surveyed before, during, and after a 3-week bicycle tour of 
California. Despite the fact that the on-line accounts were filled with tales of excessive rain, 
unamusing companions, and physical exhaustion, the retrospective accounts were 
considerably rosier (Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997). Similar discrepancies 
have been observed among vacationers to Europe and Disneyland, and even runners in the 
Chicago Marathon (Mitchell et al., 1997; Sutton, 1992; Wirtz & Kruger, 2002). 
Nowhere is the inconsistency between on-line and retrospective experience more apparent 
than in work on the “peak-and-end” effect (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman, 
Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier; 1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; see 
Fredrickson, 2000, for a review). In a series of studies, these researchers demonstrated that 
retrospective accounts of affect are influenced primarily by the peak and final moment of on-
line experience—with little regard to the duration, mean, or sum of that experience. Such 
studies have led some researchers to question the validity of retrospective measures of 
experience. Kahneman (1999) argued that retrospective reports are a “fallible estimate” of 
actual experience (p. 4), which can be assessed only by measuring an individual’s moment-
by-moment, on-line thoughts and feelings throughout the duration of an experience. 
Still, there remain important reasons to pay attention to retrospective experience, as 
Kahneman (2000) realized. Whereas on-line reports may be a better measure of “objective” 
experience, retrospective measures may better predict something equally important: future 
behavior. Whether considering a trip to Disneyland, a reunion with an old flame, or a move to 
the city, individuals base their decisions, at least in part, on their previous experiences. When 
on-line and remembered experience conflict, as they frequently do, we suspect that it is 
remembered experience, not on-line experience, that best predicts choice. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the results of Kahneman et al. (1993), who found that participants undergoing 
an ice-submersion task were more willing to repeat the trial they remembered as being less 
painful than to repeat the trial the on-line measures suggested was less painful—even after 
researchers explained the difference between the two (Kahneman, 2000). 
Although these data are suggestive, they involve relatively confined and short-term 
laboratory paradigms. It remains to be seen whether similar results would be found in a long-
term, ecological setting. In the present study, we tracked a sample of college students before, 
during, and after their spring-break vacations, then compared online and remembered 
experience as predictors of participants’ desire to repeat the experience. In addition to 
measuring on-line and remembered experience, we measured predicted experience. An 
intriguing hypothesis offered by past researchers is that predicted experience, in addition to 
on-line experience, shapes memories of events (Klaaren, Hodges, & Wilson, 1994; Mitchell 
et al., 1997; Sutton, 1992). To see why, consider vacations. Beforehand, a person might 
envision relaxing on a sunny beach or camping in an idyllic forest. But things do not always 
go as planned, and getting burned by the sun or bitten by insects is rarely something 
vacationers envisioned. However, after a vacation has ended, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the vacationer forgets the disappointments (Mitchell et al., 1997) and reinterprets 
vacation memories in ways consistent with original expectations (Klaaren et al., 1994). Or, as 
humorist Dave Barry (1991) cynically observed, “the human race is far too stupid to be 
deterred from tourism by a mere several million years of bad experiences” (p. 3). By 
measuring predictions, we could test their role not only in remembered experience, but also in 
participants’ desire to repeat the experience. 
 
METHOD 
Forty-six paid participants took part in the study. Two were excluded from the analyses 
because they failed to complete all of the dependent measures, 2 were excluded because their 
personal data assistants (PDAs) malfunctioned during break, and 1 was excluded because his 
PDA wound up on his list of “things not to forget to take to London next time.” This left a 
total of 41 students (21 women, 20 men), ages 17 to 26 (M = 21). The ethnic makeup of the 
sample was Asian (n = 22), Caucasian (n = 16), and Hispanic (n = 2); 1 individual did not 
report ethnicity. The most popular destinations were Florida (n = 6), Europe (n = 5), and 
Kentucky (n = 5). Most participants had not previously visited their destination (n = 31), 
most travelled with friends (n = 34), and vacations lasted from 4 to 11 days (M = 8). 
 
Participants were surveyed at six points over the course of about 8 weeks. Approximately 2 
weeks prior to the beginning of spring break, participants predicted their experience on a 
questionnaire administered via e-mail. The questionnaire was designed to capture three 
separate but related criteria: positive affect, negative affect, and overall subjective experience. 
Specifically, participants predicted the intensity with which they would feel five positive 
emotions (sociable, happy, calm, pleasant, and joyful) and five negative emotions (irritated, 
guilty, sad, worried, and unpleasant), each on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (maximum 
intensity; adapted from Thomas & Diener, 1990). Also, on a scale ranging from 1 (disagree) 
to 5 (agree), participants endorsed three statements designed to capture their anticipated 
overall subjective experience: “I expect to enjoy spring break,” “I think this break will be 
fun,” and “I will be satisfied with this vacation” (adapted from Mitchell et al., 1997, and 
Klaaren et al., 1994). 
 
Participants made a second set of identical predictions approximately 2 to 4 days prior to 
spring break, when picking up their PDAs. The PDA, they were told, would “beep” several 
times each day during a 13-hr period (9 a.m. to 10 p.m., or 11 a.m. to midnight), and each 
time it did they were to complete a short computerized survey. Participants were allowed to 
choose an early (n = 19) or late (n = 16) schedule; 6 participants carried PDAs requiring 
them to initiate the 13-hr sampling period themselves, upon waking. 
 
The PDAs were preprogrammed to survey participants at seven randomly selected intervals 
per day for the entire duration of the break. Each survey included the same 13 questions 
participants were asked prior to the vacation, except that verb tense was changed from future 
to present tense (e.g., “I will be satisfied with this vacation” became “I am satisfied with this 
break”). 
Approximately 2 to 4 days after spring break, participants returned the PDAs and completed 
the first of two retrospective questionnaires. The first questionnaire called for participants to 
recall their enjoyment over spring break, using the same three items as before, with the verb 
tense changed (e.g., “I was satisfied with this vacation”). The second and final retrospective 
questionnaire included the same questions but was completed via e-mail approximately 4 
weeks after spring break. Finally, participants returned to the lab approximately 5 weeks after 
spring break—8 weeks after the study began—to collect payment. At this time, they 
responded to a dependent measure representing choice, operationalized as their desire to 
repeat the experience. In particular, participants were asked, “Would you take this same 
vacation over again (assuming you hadn’t just been there, but that you know what you now 
know)?” Responses were made on a scale from 1 (definitely no) to 4 (neutral) to 7 (definitely 
yes). 
 
RESULTS 
Responses to the five positive-affect measures were highly interrelated at each time period 
(mean α = .79), as were the five negative-affect measures (mean α = .79), and the three 
overall-subjective-experience measures (mean α = .88). Thus, we averaged these measures to 
create three separate indices (positive affect, negative affect, and overall subjective 
experience) for each of the five time periods. The on-line measures were computed by taking 
a participant’s average response across the duration of the break, beginning with the first 
response the day the student left and ending with the last response on the day he or she 
returned. 
 
Our first set of analyses focused on the mean levels of predicted, on-line, and remembered 
experience. Responses to the overall-subjective- experience and positive-affect questions 
revealed a clear rosy view: Participants’ predicted and remembered experiences were more 
favorable than their mean on-line evaluations (Fig. 1). Separate pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the on-line measures were significantly significantly lower than the measures at 
all other time periods (all paired ts ˃ 3.92, ps ˃ .001, ds ˃ .61). Yet participants also 
expected and remembered more negative affect than their on-line measures corroborated, a 
view that is hardly rosy (all paired ts ˃ 3.49, ps ˃.001, ds ˃.54). We return to this issue in 
the Discussion.  
 
Our primary prediction concerned the influence of predicted, online, and remembered 
experience on the desire to repeat the experience. We first computed simple zero-order 
correlations between the various time periods for each of the three dependent measures 
(Table 1). The last column of Table 1 reveals positive correlations between desire to repeat 
the experience and the measures of overall subjective experience and positive affect, and 
negative correlations between desire to repeat the experience and measures of negative affect, 
indicating that the more favorably the trip was predicted, experienced, and remembered, the 
more participants desired to repeat it. The table also shows that this relation increased from 
predicted experience (for which correlations are small and in some cases nonsignificant) to 
online experience to remembered experience (for which correlations are sizable and 
significant). 
 
 
 
We next performed path analyses between predicted, on-line, and remembered experience 
and participants’ desire to repeat the experience, using the structural equation modeling 
program within the AMOS procedure (Arbuckle, 1999). We performed separate analyses for 
overall subjective experience, positive affect, and negative affect. For simplicity and ease of 
explanation, the results we report here include only one predicted and one remembered time 
period, 2 weeks prior to and 4 weeks after spring break, omitting the measures for 2 to 
4 days prior to break and 2 to 4 days after break. The pattern of data was similar when the 
other two time periods were included. 
 As Figure 2 shows, the best predictor of participants’ desire to repeat the break—indeed, the 
only predictor—was remembered experience. Neither predicted nor on-line experience 
uniquely predicted participants’ desire to repeat the experience in any of the three path 
analyses. In other words, remembered experience appeared to mediate the effects of on-line 
experience in predicting participants’ desire to repeat the experience. Interestingly, there was 
a tendency for predicted experience to influence remembered experience above and beyond 
online experience. Participants’ expectations had a direct influence on their memories, a 
finding consistent with prior research (Klaaren et al.,1994). 
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION 
What is the best measure of an individual’s subjective experience? Recently, it has been 
suggested that an objective record of an individual’s experience must come from a series of 
on-line assessments made during the experience, rather than from global evaluations made 
after it has ended (Kahneman, 1999). The present research suggests that regardless of the 
veracity of this view, retrospective measures may be important as well. In a path analysis 
comparing the relations among predicted, on-line, and remembered experience of spring-
break vacationers and their desire to take a similar vacation in the future, the best predictor of 
that desire was remembered experience. Although on-line measures may be superior for 
estimating experience, retrospective global evaluations may be superior for predicting 
people’s future choices. 
 
We do not mean to suggest that what took place during students’ vacations had nothing to do 
with their later memories. On-line ratings were highly related to retrospective evaluations of 
the break (Fig. 2). However, the nonsignificant path between on-line experience and the 
desire to repeat the experience in the complete model suggests that when on-line and 
remembered experience differed, it was remembered experience that predicted this desire. 
This was true despite the fact that of the two measures, on-line experience was by far the 
more reliable, as it was an aggregate of dozens of measurements collected over multiple days. 
The fact that retrospective measures may be better predictors of future choices than on-line 
evaluations, while at the same time being less accurate, points to the likelihood that 
individuals often make choices that fail to optimize hedonic experience. 
 
One unexpected finding came from our measure of negative affect: Students predicted and 
remembered experiencing higher levels of negative affect than their on-line experiences 
corroborated (Fig. 1). At first glance, these findings appear contradictory not only with our 
findings for overall subjective experience and positive affect, but also with prior work 
suggesting a “rosy view” in predicted and remembered experience (Mitchell et al., 1997; 
Sutton, 1992; Wirtz & Kruger, 2002). Yet although the present data are inconsistent in one 
sense—that participants anticipated and remembered spring break as being both better and 
worse than it really was—they are consistent in another: Participants overestimated the 
intensity of their spring-break experience. Other researchers have found a similar 
overestimation of intensity for predictions and recollections of positive and negative affect 
(Buehler & McFarland, 2001; McFarland, Ross, & DeCourville, 1989; Thomas & Diener, 
1990; Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2002). 
 
Why do people systematically overestimate affective intensity? Although they know that 
most events have both positive and negative moments, we suspect that people fail to consider 
all that does not happen: the moments in between the notable events and their affective 
reactions to those moments. When people predict and remember their experiences, 
hedonically neutral events are unlikely to be taken into account (cf. Loewenstein & Schkade, 
1999; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). One possible explanation is that 
people hold implicit theories that guide their predictions and recollections (Ross, 1989). An 
implicit theory of spring break as an affectively intense event may fail to take into account all 
the break’s relatively neutral moments, resulting in an overestimation of both global positive 
affect and global negative affect. 
 
Of course, future work is necessary in order to further determine what factors account for and 
influence this overestimation of intensity in predictions and recollections. In addition, future 
work might benefit from a different operationalization of choice. Recall that participants were 
asked to indicate their desire to take a similar trip in the future, rather than to actually choose 
and then participate in another trip. Although such “behavioroid” measures have been shown 
to have validity (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990), future research might 
benefit from a direct measure of future behavior.  
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